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In their editorial, Tangcharoensathien et al1 describe the challenges of industry market promotion and policy 
interference from Big Tobacco, Alcohol, and Food in addressing non-communicable diseases (NCDs). They 
provide an overview of the increasing influence of corporate interest in emerging economies and government 
attempts to implement the World Health Organization (WHO) ‘best buy’ interventions. The authors largely 
draw on examples from Asia and a few selected countries, but provide little detail as to how aggressive marketing 
and policy interference plays out in a context of poor legislation and regulation  in many low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs), where the burden of NCDs is increasing at an alarming rate and governments face 
a high burden of disease with a limited budget for countering industry interference. This commentary provides 
some poignant examples of the influence of Big Tobacco, Alcohol, and Food on market regulation and policy 
interference in LMICs and argues for more policy coherence and accountability in terms of multisectoral action 
and civil society activism. Securing funds for health promotion and establishing health promotion foundations 
could help achieve that goal.
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Big Tobacco: Aggressive Marketing and Policy Interference
The tobacco industry has increasingly turned its focus toward 
emerging markets, seeking for example, to exploit patchwork 
regulations for tobacco control in sub-Saharan Africa.2,3 The 
high level of tobacco marketing in low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) has been associated with its changing 
demographics, including a large youth population and rising 
prosperity,4 and with high-income countries (HICs) having 
more established policies on tobacco control.5 For example, 
whilst being legally challenged in Germany for launching a 
mass media campaign encouraging smoking among youth 
in 2011, Philip Morris International (PMI), a leading global 
tobacco company, continued to roll out its campaign in over 
50 countries, including LMICs, some of which suffer the 
world’s highest rates of tobacco use.6 
In Indonesia, where tobacco advertising laws are weak, PMI 
put up massive billboards in streets, and in Brazil, PMI placed 
its posters at the point of sale, taking advantage of the lack 
of regulation and inspection to enforce the existing point of 
sale advertising ban.6 PMI was also fined over US$480 000 
for violating the National Advertising Self-Regulation Code 
in São Paulo.7 In India, another market with significant 
opportunity for growth, PMI was criticized for targeting 
youth,8 and in the Philippines PMI promoted their brands 
across all media.9 A study conducted in 2012 among five- and 
six-year-olds in six LMICs, including Brazil, China, India, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, and Russia, indicated that 22% of children 
were able to correctly identify a major PMI brand, including 
43% of Chinese youth.10 
Research conducted in 16 countries found significantly 
more tobacco advertisements and outlets in LMICs compared 
with HICs,5 and in a study assessing tobacco control in 17 
HICs and LMICs that ratified the Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control (FCTC), implementation of tobacco 
control policies was found to be weak, in particular in poorer 
countries.11 Taken together, the evidence shows that tobacco 
industry strategies aimed at marketing in LMICs abound, 
and point to the need for comprehensive bans on tobacco 
advertising, promotion and sponsorship.
Similar tactics are used in Africa, where for example in 
Guinea, ‘cigarette girls’ are recruited and paid attractive 
salaries as marketing executives to promote local brands.2 In 
South Africa, where tobacco advertising and sponsorship was 
banned in January 2001 in line with FCTC recommendations, 
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British American Tobacco (BAT), the largest tobacco 
company in the world, used viral marketing and young 
‘brand amplifiers’ to relaunch its major cigarette brand.12 
A study of BAT sponsorship in South Africa and Nigeria 
also reported the use of music as a marketing tool to target 
young consumers, indicating the limits of national regulatory 
efforts.13 Permissiveness toward tobacco sponsorship in Africa 
has equally shown to undermine tobacco control support.14 
In pursuit of its expansion in Africa, BAT has used 
intimidatory tactics in attempts to suppress health warnings 
and policy regulation.15 As pointed out by Tangcharoensathien 
et al,1 BAT fought courts in Kenya and Uganda in attempts 
to prevent government from introducing tobacco control 
measures.15 BAT has also been involved in illicit tobacco trade, 
relying on informal channels to supply markets across Africa 
since the 1980s, and attempted to gain leverage in negotiations 
with governments for market access and foreign investment.16 
Recently BAT has been investigated by the UK Serious Fraud 
Office on suspicion of corruption over claims that it bribed 
officials in East Africa to undermine anti-smoking laws,17 and 
accused of avoiding to pay corporate taxes in LMICs, thereby 
robbing already strained systems of vital resources to pay for 
healthcare needs inflicted by tobacco-related illness.18
In an attempt to shift debate away from the protection of 
public health, BAT uses corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
strategies such as supporting tobacco farmers, or funding 
HIV/AIDS initiatives.19 Internal BAT documents revealed 
how similar tactics were used in China, where illicit trade 
was a critical factor in its market expansion,20 and where 
CSR was used to secure access to policy-makers.19 As in HICs 
elsewhere, CSR as a political activity has been instrumental 
to protecting Big Tobacco in LMICs, in combination with 
lobbying and the offer of voluntary self-regulation codes,4,21 
which the industry frequently complements with ineffective 
mass education programs. In the early 1990s, for example, 
PMI launched youth smoking prevention programs in Latin 
America, enabling them to undermine tobacco control 
interventions required by the FCTC.22
Big Alcohol: The Illusion of Responsibility
Like Big Tobacco, the global alcohol industry has expanded 
its market in LMICs in the last decades. Diageo and 
SABMiller, two of the largest alcohol industries, reformed 
their corporate structure and operations to maximise 
opportunities for expansion across LMICs.23 In spite of the 
evidence that alcohol policies, in particular those related 
to price and availability, and advertising bans are effective 
strategies to reduce alcohol-related harm and are associated 
with lower alcohol consumption in LMICs,24,25 the alcohol 
industry and its front groups actively promote partnership 
with governments to influence national alcohol policies,26 eg, 
through the International Center on Alcohol Policies, which 
was co-founded by PMI.27 National alcohol policy documents 
in Lesotho, Malawi, Uganda, and Botswana for example were 
all found to reflect industry interests, focusing on individual 
behaviour and ignoring more effective population based 
interventions.26 
In India, strategies for expansion by Diageo in 2013 
and 2014 focused on India’s younger generation, women, 
and the emerging middle class for growth opportunities.28 
Questionable practices are used, for example by Heineken, 
which employs ‘beer girls’ in Africa and Asia, who are hired 
by bar owners to circulate on the premises and encourage 
men to drink more.29 Although the practice has existed for 
a long time and Heineken repeatedly promised to abandon 
the strategy, it only made headlines in 2018 when the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria suspended its planned 
partnership with the alcohol giant because of “the company’s 
use of female beer promoters in ways that expose them to 
sexual exploitation and health risks.” 30
Investigation also showed how Heineken collaborates with 
dictators and authoritarian governments, avoids taxes, and 
has been linked to human rights violations and high level 
corruption.29 CSR initiatives, used to influence the framing 
of alcohol-related issues in line with industry interests, but 
not shown to reduce harmful drinking,31,32 include eg, the 
introduction of a successful workplace program for voluntary 
HIV counselling, testing and treatment in Rwanda,33 and 
support of an annual symposium to create awareness of 
‘the health and nutritional benefits of beer consumption’ in 
Nigeria.34 In South Africa, SAB in 2017 initiated a campaign 
targeting university students as beneficiaries of a food 
supplementation project funded by proceeds of beer sales, but 
it suspended the program after significant pressure from the 
public health community.35
In South Africa, the alcohol industry also established an 
Association for Responsible Alcohol Use as a front group 
and seeks to influence government policies by eg, sponsoring 
trips for parliamentarians, funding educational workshops, 
and partnering with the Department of Trade & Industry 
to sponsor underage drinking initiatives.36 In doing so, the 
alcohol industry tries to obtain a legitimate platform for 
lobbying against proposals around the reduction of alcohol 
availability, taxation, and marketing restrictions, despite the 
global evidence showing that these are cost-effective measures 
to decrease alcohol-related harm.36,37 In an effort to reduce 
alcohol consumption, in 2018, a Liquor Amendment Bill was 
introduced to South Africa’s Parliament, proposing a ban on 
all alcohol advertising, but this met with strong opposition 
from the industry.38,39 
Big Food and Soda: Another Game of Thrones
Similarly, the food industry interferes with policy in LMICs 
through lobbying and securing buy-in from policy-makers, as 
illustrated for example by the influence of the soda industry 
on obesity science and health policy in China.40,41 Coca-Cola, 
the world’s largest producer of sugar-sweetened beverages 
(SSB), also funds scientists who shift the blame for obesity 
away from bad diets, towards promoting a balanced and 
active lifestyle,42,43 despite strong evidence of the impact of 
an SSB tax.44 Increased levels of SSB consumption have been 
blamed for fuelling the obesity epidemic worldwide, which 
in LMICs adds to an already high burden of undernutrition 
and infectious diseases.45 A recent study which showed that 
globally, children are exposed to high volumes of television 
advertising for unhealthy foods and beverages, adds more fuel 
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to the fire.46
The food industry has also rapidly expanded in LMICs, as a 
result of mass-marketing campaigns and foreign investment, 
primarily through takeovers of domestic food companies.47 
In China and India, Coca-Cola successfully re-entered the 
market after liberalization of their economies, and sought 
to influence government and key organizations to increase 
consumption and challenge public health policy.48 Big Food 
is a driving force behind the rise in SSBs consumption and 
processed foods rich in salt, sugar and fat,49 which has been 
linked to the rising levels of obesity and diabetes in LMICs.50 
In South Africa, the number of transactions from fast food 
chains has increased significantly in the last decades, many 
of which are linked to soft drink companies, and food 
manufacturers have increased their market shares by making 
their foods more available, affordable, and acceptable.51
Like the tobacco and alcohol industries, major food 
manufacturers and retailers in South Africa have active CSR 
programs, with an often-strong focus on nutrition education. 
The food industry has taken voluntary action on food 
marketing through the South Africa Pledge on Marketing 
to Children, but there are many exclusions related to the 
packaging and labelling, and so far none of the signatories, 
including food manufacturers, retailers, and fast food chains, 
have made any real commitments.51,52 In a study assessing the 
content of television food advertisements in South Africa, 
nearly half of the ads viewed during child and family time 
were for food, including desserts and sweets, fast foods and 
sweetened drinks.53 There were also three times as many ads 
for unhealthy foods and beverages as for healthy foods during 
peak times, despite government regulation and the industry 
code for self-regulation applied through the Advertising 
Standards Authority of South Africa.46
So far, the changes in South Africa’s food industry practices 
have contributed to a steady increase in per capita food supply 
of fat, protein, and calories, which appear to be associated with 
unhealthful changes in dietary patterns and increased sales in 
most categories of packaged foods.51 South Africa acts as a 
trade hub for the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC),54 and several studies have documented an increased 
consumption of processed foods and sugary beverages in all 
SADC countries since the mid-1990s, along with decreased 
consumption of healthier traditional foods.55,56 Processed and 
packaged foods and beverages are also rapidly reaching food 
insecure populations in other LMICs, as shown for example 
when looking at consumption patterns in Mexico and China, 
and pose a major challenge to the food system and the health 
of poor and vulnerable populations.57
Discussion
Reducing the impact of tobacco, unhealthy diets and 
harmful alcohol consumption worldwide, and in LMICs 
in particular, constitutes a grand challenge for the public 
health community, and requires understanding of how these 
‘industrial epidemics’ contribute to the rising burden of non-
communicable diseases (NCDs) through the promotion of 
products damaging to health and indirectly through influence 
over public policy.58
As this commentary has shown, Big Tobacco, Alcohol, 
and Food use opportunistic strategies to enter LMICs, where 
industry marketing and policy interference is less controlled 
and monitored. The continued profitability of these industries 
is linked to their ability to resist policy regulation, but also 
to the speed with which they exploit the relative lack of 
regulation in LMICs and switch their focus away from the 
traditional markets.18 As regards Big Tobacco, WHO has 
actively sought to monitor and contain industry influence, 
with FCTC Article 5.3 requiring to protect public health 
policies ‘from commercial and other vested interests of the 
tobacco industry.’ Its approach to food and alcohol industries, 
however, is different, with both its Global Strategy on Diet, 
Physical Activity and Health59 and more recent Global Strategy 
to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol60 assuming scope for 
partnership and cooperation, which the FCTC precludes.58
The active promotion of international interests of the 
alcohol industry contrasts with attitudes towards the interest 
of tobacco companies. Given that the harm caused by alcohol 
is much greater in LMICs and that alcohol use has become the 
single largest behavioural risk factor for disease and disability 
in middle-income countries,61 concerted policy actions are 
required to reduce alcohol consumption in LMICs.62 Alcohol 
is subject to less stringent forms of regulation, and the alcohol 
industry continues to play a role in policy-making in many 
countries worldwide.63 Given the many similarities that exist, 
however, between the tobacco and alcohol industries in terms 
of marketing and political strategies, there is a clear need for 
policy coherence and monitoring of policies that regulate 
alcohol marketing and availability, in particular in LMICs.
Finally, as regards the global and increasing impact of the 
food industry on the rising burden of NCDs and childhood 
obesity, in LMICs in particular, a stricter monitoring of policy 
is warranted. Implementation of evidence-informed policies, 
and monitoring of industry driven policy interference is 
paramount to achieving this objective and will require 
continued attention of health policy-makers, civil society 
and the public health community. Setting up a framework 
legislation for NCDs extending beyond tobacco control 
may be a good option to help achieve this goal, including 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3.5, which aims at 
strengthening the prevention and treatment of substance 
abuse, including the harmful use of alcohol. Given that 
Big Tobacco, Alcohol, and Food use similar strategies to 
undermine NCD prevention and control, policies aimed at 
regulating and preventing the harm caused by these industries 
should hence be based on policy coherence. Although not a 
substitute for detailed legislation governing tobacco, alcohol, 
and food marketing and control, it could have the potential to 
accelerate national progress by raising the political profile of 
NCDs, and clarifying who is accountable for coordinating a 
cross-sectoral response.64
In addition to paying more attention to broader governance 
and regulatory structures to identify and reduce industry 
interference on NCD prevention laws and policies,65 it is 
however also necessary to examine the role of civil society. 
Examples of best practices and challenges faced by civil society 
acting against transnational corporations in a neoliberal policy 
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environment exist and have been documented.66 Advocacy and 
activism responding to products, practices or policy influence 
from the Big industries can mediate negative health impacts, 
which in turn can be supported by securing funds for health 
promotion, such as adopting a policy earmarking ‘sin’ taxes 
for the creation of health promotion foundations.67-69 Activism 
is also needed to hold governments accountable for national 
NCD responses and implementing whole-of-government and 
-society approaches, underpinned by multisectoral action for 
health.70 In South Africa, for example, government and civil 
society have since the introduction of democracy in 1994 used 
regulation, public education, health services, and community 
mobilization to address corporate practices that increase 
NCD risk.54 As highlighted in the Montevideo Roadmap 
2018-2030 on NCDs, firm commitment and support from 
the international community is however needed if the goal 
of reducing by 2030 by one third premature mortality from 
NCDs (SDG 3.4) in LMICs is to be achieved.
Acknowledgements
In remembrance of Prof Emeritus David Sanders, global public 
health pioneer and advocate of people’s health, who recently 
passed away whilst on holiday. His invaluable contributions 
to advancing primary healthcare based on the principles of 
social justice and equity and his fierce criticism of the impact 
of neoliberalism on global health will forever be remembered 





Author declares that he has no competing interests. 
Author’s contribution
PD is the single author of the paper.
References
1. Tangcharoensathien V, Chandrasiri O, Kunpeuk W, Markchang 
K, Pangkariya N. Addressing NCDs: challenges from industry 
market promotion and interferences. Int J Health Policy Manag. 
2019;8(5):256-260. doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2019.02
2. Doku D. The tobacco industry tactics-a challenge for tobacco control 
in low and middle income countries. Afr Health Sci. 2010;10(2):201-
203. 
3. Gilmore AB, Fooks G, Drope J, Bialous SA, Jackson RR. Exposing 
and addressing tobacco industry conduct in low-income and middle-
income countries. Lancet. 2015;385(9972):1029-1043. doi:10.1016/
s0140-6736(15)60312-9
4. Lee S, Ling PM, Glantz SA. The vector of the tobacco epidemic: 
tobacco industry practices in low and middle-income countries. 
Cancer Causes Control. 2012;23 Suppl 1:117-129. doi:10.1007/
s10552-012-9914-0
5. Savell E, Gilmore AB, Sims M, et al. The environmental profile of a 
community’s health: a cross-sectional study on tobacco marketing 
in 16 countries. Bull World Health Organ. 2015;93(12):851-861g. 
doi:10.2471/blt.15.155846
6. ACT Brazil, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Corporate 
Accountability International, Framework Convention Alliance, 
InterAmerican Heart Foundation, Southeast Asia Tobacco Control 
Alliance. Maybe you’re the target: New Global Marlboro Campaign 
Found to Target Teens. Published 2014.
7. Philip Morris International Fined in Brazil for Targeting Youth with 
its “Be Marlboro” Ads. Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids website. 
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/blog/2014_08_28_pmi. Accessed 
May 20, 2019. Published August 28, 2014.
8. Kalra A, Bansal P, Lasseter T, Wilson D. The Philip Morris Files - Part 
2: Marlboro Country. In: Hirschberg P, ed. Philip Morris takes aim 
at young people in India, and health officials are fuming. Reuters; 
2017.
9. Alechnowicz K, Chapman S. The Philippine tobacco industry: “the 
strongest tobacco lobby in Asia.” Tob Control. 2004;13 Suppl 2:ii71-
78. doi:10.1136/tc.2004.009324
10. Borzekowski DL, Cohen JE. International reach of tobacco 
marketing among young children. Pediatrics. 2013;132(4):e825-
831. doi:10.1542/peds.2013-1150
11. Chow CK, Corsi DJ, Gilmore AB, et al. Tobacco control 
environment: cross-sectional survey of policy implementation, 
social unacceptability, knowledge of tobacco health harms and 
relationship to quit ratio in 17 low-income, middle-income and high-
income countries. BMJ Open. 2017;7(3):e013817. doi:10.1136/
bmjopen-2016-013817
12. Chapman S. Vector control: Controlling the tobacco industry and its 
promotions. Public Health Advocacy and Tobacco Control: Making 
Smoking History. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing; 2007:172-197.
13. Patel P, Okechukwu CA, Collin J, Hughes B. Bringing ‘Light, Life 
and Happiness’: British American Tobacco and musicsponsorship 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Third World Q. 2009;30(4):685-700. 
doi:10.1080/01436590902867110
14. Ayo-Yusuf OA, Olutola BG, Agaku IT. Permissiveness toward 
tobacco sponsorship undermines tobacco control support in Africa. 
Health Promot Int. 2016;31(2):414-422. doi:10.1093/heapro/dau102
15. Boseley S. Threats, bullying, lawsuits: Tobacco industry’s dirty war 
for the African market. The Guardian. 2017. https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2017/jul/12/big-tobacco-dirty-war-africa-market. 
16. Legresley E, Lee K, Muggli ME, Patel P, Collin J, Hurt RD. British 
American Tobacco and the “insidious impact of illicit trade” 
in cigarettes across Africa. Tob Control. 2008;17(5):339-346. 
doi:10.1136/tc.2008.025999
17. Sullivan C. BAT investigated by Serious Fraud Office over bribery 
allegations. Financial Times. 2017. https://www.ft.com/content/
fd6eb592-7682-11e7-90c0-90a9d1bc9691. 
18. Tax Justice Network. Ashes to ashes: How British American Tobacco 
avoids taxes in Low- and Middle-Income Countries. London: Tax 
Justsice Network; 2019.
19. Rimmer L. BAT in its own words. London: Action on Smoking and 
Health, Christian Aid and Friends of the Earth; 2005.
20. Lee K, Collin J. “Key to the future”: British American tobacco 
and cigarette smuggling in China. PLoS Med. 2006;3(7):e228. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0030228
21. Fooks GJ, Gilmore AB, Smith KE, Collin J, Holden C, Lee K. 
Corporate social responsibility and access to policy elites: an analysis 
of tobacco industry documents. PLoS Med. 2011;8(8):e1001076. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001076
22. Sebrié EM, Glantz SA. Attempts to undermine tobacco control: 
tobacco industry “youth smoking prevention” programs to undermine 
meaningful tobacco control in Latin America. Am J Public Health. 
2007;97(8):1357-1367. doi:10.2105/ajph.2006.094128
23. Collin J, Johnson E, Officer H, Hill S. Government support for 
alcohol industry: promoting exports, jeopardising global health? 
BMJ. 2014;348:g3648. doi:10.1136/bmj.g3648
24. Anderson P, Chisholm D, Fuhr DC. Effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness of policies and programmes to reduce the harm caused 
by alcohol. Lancet. 2009;373(9682):2234-2246. doi:10.1016/s0140-
6736(09)60744-3
25. Cook WK, Bond J, Greenfield TK. Are alcohol policies associated 
with alcohol consumption in low- and middle-income countries? 
Addiction. 2014;109(7):1081-1090. doi:10.1111/add.12571
26. Bakke Ø, Endal D. Vested interests in addiction research and 
policy alcohol policies out of context: drinks industry supplanting 
government role in alcohol policies in sub-Saharan Africa. Addiction. 
2010;105(1):22-28. doi:10.1111/j.1360-0443.2009.02695.x
27. Jernigan DH. Global alcohol producers, science, and policy: the 
case of the International Center for Alcohol Policies. Am J Public 
Health. 2012;102(1):80-89. doi:10.2105/ajph.2011.300269
28. Esser MB, Jernigan DH. Multinational Alcohol Market Development 
and Public Health: Diageo in India. Am J Public Health. 
2015;105(11):2220-2227. doi:10.2105/ajph.2015.302831
Delobelle
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2019, 8(12), 727–731 731
29. van Beemen O. Heineken in Africa: A Multinational Unleashed. 
London: Hurst; 2019.
30. The Global Fund. Global Fund Suspends Partnership with Heineken. 
Geneva: The Global Fund; 2018.
31. Mialon M, McCambridge J. Alcohol industry corporate social 
responsibility initiatives and harmful drinking: a systematic review. 
Eur J Public Health. 2018;28(4):664-673. doi:10.1093/eurpub/
cky065
32. Yoon S, Lam TH. The illusion of righteousness: corporate social 
responsibility practices of the alcohol industry. BMC Public Health. 
2013;13:630. doi:10.1186/1471-2458-13-630
33. Collier AC, Van der Borght SF, Rinke de Wit T, Richards SC, 
Feeley FG. A successful workplace program for voluntary 
counseling and testing and treatment of HIV/AIDS at Heineken, 
Rwanda. Int J Occup Environ Health. 2007;13(1):99-106. 
doi:10.1179/107735207800244910
34. Dumbili EW. Heightened hypocrisy: a critical analysis of how the 
alcohol industry-sponsored ‘‘Nigerian Beer Symposium’’ jeopardises 
public health. Drugs (Abingdon Engl). 2019;26(3):287-291. doi:10.1
080/09687637.2017.1421144
35. Molelekwa J. Calls mount to boycott SAB’s campaign against hunger. 
IOL News. August 1, 2017. https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/
calls-mount-to-boycott-sabs-campaign-against-hunger-10579697. 
36. Matzopoulos R, Parry CD, Corrigall J, Myers J, Goldstein S, London 
L. Global Fund collusion with liquor giant is a clear conflict of 
interest. Bull World Health Organ. 2012;90(1):67-69; discussion 70. 
doi:10.2471/blt.11.091413
37. Parry C. African experience supports view that the global alcohol 
industry should have no role in the formulation of public health 
policies. Addiction. 2014;109(7):1211-1212. doi:10.1111/add.12582
38. Parry C, Burnhams NH, London L. A total ban on alcohol advertising: 
presenting the public health case. S Afr Med J. 2012;102(7):602-
604. 
39. Parry C, London L, Myers B. Delays in South Africa’s plans to ban 
alcohol advertising. Lancet. 2014;383(9933):1972. doi:10.1016/
s0140-6736(14)60954-5
40. Greenhalgh S. Making China safe for Coke: how Coca-Cola 
shaped obesity science and policy in China. BMJ. 2019;364:k5050. 
doi:10.1136/bmj.k5050
41. Greenhalgh S. Soda industry influence on obesity science and 
policy in China. J Public Health Policy. 2019;40(1):5-16. doi:10.1057/
s41271-018-00158-x
42. O’Connor A. Coca-Cola funds scientists who shift blame for obesity 
away from bad diets. The New York Times. August 9, 2015. https://
well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/coca-cola-funds-scientists-who-
shift-blame-for-obesity-away-from-bad-diets/. 
43. Serôdio PM, McKee M, Stuckler D. Coca-Cola - a model of 
transparency in research partnerships? A network analysis of 
Coca-Cola’s research funding (2008-2016). Public Health Nutr. 
2018;21(9):1594-1607. doi:10.1017/s136898001700307x
44. Colchero MA, Rivera-Dommarco J, Popkin BM, Ng SW. In 
Mexico, evidence of sustained consumer response two years 
after implementing a sugar-sweetened beverage tax. Health Aff 
(Millwood). 2017;36(3):564-571. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2016.1231
45. McHiza ZJ, Parker WA, Labadarios D. Mitigating the consumption 
of sugar-sweetened beverages: the developing country perspective. 
Public Health Nutr. 2016;19(13):2293-2295. doi:10.1017/
s1368980016002202
46. Kelly B, Vandevijvere S, Ng S, et al. Global benchmarking of 
children’s exposure to television advertising of unhealthy foods 
and beverages across 22 countries. Obes Rev. 2019. doi:10.1111/
obr.12840
47. Stuckler D, Nestle M. Big food, food systems, and global health. PLoS 
Med. 2012;9(6):e1001242. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001242
48. Williams SN. The incursion of ‘Big Food’ in middle-income countries: 
a qualitative documentary case study analysis of the soft drinks 
industry in China and India. Crit Public Health. 2015;25(4):455-473. 
doi:10.1080/09581596.2015.1005056
49. Mendez Lopez A, Loopstra R, McKee M, Stuckler D. Is trade 
liberalisation a vector for the spread of sugar-sweetened beverages? 
A cross-national longitudinal analysis of 44 low- and middle-
income countries. Soc Sci Med. 2017;172:21-27. doi:10.1016/j.
socscimed.2016.11.001
50. Basu S, Stuckler D, McKee M, Galea G. Nutritional determinants 
of worldwide diabetes: an econometric study of food markets 
and diabetes prevalence in 173 countries. Public Health Nutr. 
2013;16(1):179-186. doi:10.1017/s1368980012002881
51. Igumbor EU, Sanders D, Puoane TR, et al. “Big food,” the 
consumer food environment, health, and the policy response in 
South Africa. PLoS Med. 2012;9(7):e1001253. doi:10.1371/journal.
pmed.1001253
52. Hawkes C, Harris JL. An analysis of the content of food industry 
pledges on marketing to children. Public Health Nutr. 2011;14(8):1403-
1414. doi:10.1017/s1368980011000607
53. McHiza ZJ, Temple NJ, Steyn NP, Abrahams Z, Clayford M. Content 
analysis of television food advertisements aimed at adults and 
children in South Africa. Public Health Nutr. 2013;16(12):2213-2220. 
doi:10.1017/s136898001300205x
54. Delobelle P, Sanders D, Puoane T, Freudenberg N. Reducing the Role 
of the Food, Tobacco, and Alcohol Industries in Noncommunicable 
Disease Risk in South Africa. Health Educ Behav. 2016;43(1 
Suppl):70s-81s. doi:10.1177/1090198115610568
55. Abrahams Z, McHiza Z, Steyn NP. Diet and mortality rates in Sub-
Saharan Africa: stages in the nutrition transition. BMC Public Health. 
2011;11:801. doi:10.1186/1471-2458-11-801
56. Hamada A, Mori M, Mori H, et al. Deterioration of traditional dietary 
custom increases the risk of lifestyle-related diseases in young male 
Africans. J Biomed Sci. 2010;17 Suppl 1:S34. doi:10.1186/1423-
0127-17-s1-s34
57. Popkin BM. Nutrition, agriculture and the global food system in 
low and middle income countries. Food Policy. 2014;47:91-96. 
doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2014.05.001
58. Gilmore AB, Savell E, Collin J. Public health, corporations and 
the new responsibility deal: promoting partnerships with vectors 
of disease? J Public Health (Oxf). 2011;33(1):2-4. doi:10.1093/
pubmed/fdr008
59. World Health Organization (WHO). Global Strategy on Diet, Physical 
Activity and Health. Geneva: WHO; 2004.
60. World Health Organization (WHO). Global strategy to reduce the 
harmful use of alcohol. Geneva: WHO; 2010.
61. World Health Organization (WHO). Global status report on alcohol 
and health 2018. Geneva: WHO; 2018.
62. Buse K, Tanaka S, Hawkes S. Healthy people and healthy profits? 
Elaborating a conceptual framework for governing the commercial 
determinants of non-communicable diseases and identifying 
options for reducing risk exposure. Global Health. 2017;13(1):34. 
doi:10.1186/s12992-017-0255-3
63. Hawkins B, Holden C, Eckhardt J, Lee K. Reassessing policy 
paradigms: A comparison of the global tobacco and alcohol 
industries. Glob Public Health. 2018;13(1):1-19. doi:10.1080/1744
1692.2016.1161815
64. Magnusson RS. Framework legislation for non-communicable 
diseases: and for the Sustainable Development Goals? BMJ Glob 
Health. 2017;2(3):e000385. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000385
65. Reeve B, Gostin LO. “Big” Food, Tobacco, and Alcohol: Reducing 
Industry Influence on Noncommunicable Disease Prevention Laws 
and Policies Comment on “Addressing NCDs: Challenges From 
Industry Market Promotion and Interferences.” Int J Health Policy 
Manag. 2019;8(7):450-454. doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2019.30
66. Anaf J, Baum F, Fisher M, Friel S. Civil society action against 
transnational corporations: implications for health promotion. Health 
Promot Int. 2019. doi:10.1093/heapro/daz088
67. Schang LK, Czabanowska KM, Lin V. Securing funds for health 
promotion: lessons from health promotion foundations based 
on experiences from Austria, Australia, Germany, Hungary and 
Switzerland. Health Promot Int. 2012;27(2):295-305. doi:10.1093/
heapro/dar023
68. Tangcharoensathien V, Sopitarchasak S, Viriyathorn S, et al. 
Innovative Financing for Health Promotion: A Global Review and 
Thailand Case Study. In: Quah SR, ed. International Encyclopedia 
of Public Health. 2nd ed. Oxford: Academic Press; 2017:275-287.
69. Perez AM, Ayo-Yusuf OA, Hofman K, et al. Establishing a health 
promotion and development foundation in South Africa. S Afr Med J. 
2013;103(3):147-149. doi:10.7196/samj.6281
70. Tangcharoensathien V, Srisookwatana O, Pinprateep P, Posayanonda 
T, Patcharanarumol W. Multisectoral actions for health: challenges 
and opportunities in complex policy environments. Int J Health Policy 
Manag. 2017;6(7):359-363. doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2017.61
